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Towards Privacy-Aware Handling of Authorizations

Policy 2007, Bologna, Italy




Security functionality and needed data

- Identification
 - Biometric data
- Authentication
 - Passwords, keys
- Authorization and access control
 - Policies, attributes
- Auditing
 - Log data



Centralised security data – the example of MS Passport

Single Sign-On Service for the Web



Today, it can be considered as failed

Issues with central storage and handling

Privacy

- User profiling
- Illegit distribution of information
- Compromise
- Failure of central components
 Replication only partly helpful

Centralisation is antithetical to the distributed nature of the Internet [Kormann/Rubin, 2000] Towards Privacy-Aware Handling of Authorizations



Goals of our work

- The focus is on storage and processing of authorizations as these suffer from privacy problems, too
- We envision a system that tackles the aforementioned issues
- The user shall have some degree of control over how und where his authorizations are processed and stored ("User Centricity")



Partitioning of policies


- Policies consist of authorizations and apply to defined subjects and objects and different operations
- General criteria of partitioning:
 - Subject-, object-, or operation-oriented
 - Semantic criteria

Have to be applied to the different AC models



Matrix-based models


- Authorizations exist directly between subjects and objects as entries in cells of a matrix M
- Partitioning of M into submatrices via $M_i: s \times o \rightarrow Op$





Role-based models

- The concept of a role as an intermediary between subjects and authorizations
- Role-permission and subject-role assignments can be split up



Attribute-based and mandatory AC models

- ABAC: dynamic authorizations
 - Subjects and objects are specified via a set of attributes and conditions
 - Techniques for hiding policies and attributes have been developed (e.g., Frikken et al. 2006; Li/Li 2006)
- MAC: authorizations are determined via a fixed set of rules plus metadata (clearance/classification)
- However, the processing of authorizations can be governed



Controlling the processing of authorizations

- Paradigm: User Centricity
- The user should be able to define
 - which PDP should evaluate the authorization
 - where the according policy is stored



Privacy implications

	Centralised Storage	Distributed Storage
Centralised PDP	All authorizations and their usage are known to a single entity.	Each authorization process, but only part of a user's authorizations is known to a specific PDP.
Distributed PDPs	All authorizations are known to a single entity but not the time of their usage.	Knowledge on user's potential and performed authorizations is distributed among distinct entities.



Outlook

Further development of the approach

- Impact on policy administration
- Usability aspects
- Trust relationships between participating entities



Thank you very much!

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